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SAMAL H. R. MANEE 
EXPLORING SEARLE’S SOCIAL ONTOLOGY 
Abstract: In this short article, I will explore John Searle’s social onto-
logy project from the perspective of social epistemology. The outcome of 
my analysis is that language is decisive for the collective acquisition and 
production of knowledge. I agree with Searle regarding the exposure of 
language as a central constitutive component of social forms of knowledge, 
a component that plays a significant role in the development of social epi-
stemology. 
In Searle's account, all institutional facts are linguistically created and 
maintained. I agree that language should play a central role in any social 
ontology, in social epistemology, as well as for our understanding of socie-
ty. But when we bring in language and make it the central focus and foun-
dation in explaining how society is created and functions, it becomes inevi-
table to bring in the diversity of views in theories of meaning and to ana-
lyze how these contribute to the creation and maintenance of society. Other 
questions also need to be addressed, including those related to the so-called 
“problem of group belief justification”, as it is not clear how it fits into 
Searle’s project and how individual convictions become convictions of the 
community. 
Keywords: language; society; belief; knowledge; social epistemology. 
 
 
Самал Х. Р. Мани – Изследване на социалната онтология на Сърл 
Резюме: В тази кратка статия ще изследвам проекта за социална 
онтология на Джон Сърл от гледна точка на социалната епистемоло-
гия. Резултатът от анализа е, че езикът има решаваща роля за придо-
биването и производството на колективно знание. Съгласна съм със 
Сърл, че езикът трябва да се представи като централен конститутивен 
компонент на социалните форми на знание, което оказва значително 
влияние върху развитието на социалната епистемология. Според 
Сърл, всички институционални факти са лингвистично създадени и 
поддържани. Аз също смятам, че езикът трябва да играе централна 
роля в социалната епистемология, както и в разбирането ни за общес-
твото. Когато обаче правим езика главен фокус и фундаментален мо-
мент в обяснението на това как се създава обществото и как функцио-
нира, става неизбежно и привличането на различните възгледи в тео-
риите за значението и анализ на това как те допринасят за създаването 
и поддържането на обществото. От отговор се нуждаят и други въпро-
си, сред тях този, който е известен като „проблем за обосноваването 
на груповите убеждения“, тъй като не е ясно как това се вмества в 
проекта на Сърл и как индивидуалното убеждение се превръща в 
убеждение на общността. 
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Introduction 
In this short article, I will explore John Searle’s social ontology project from 
the social epistemology perspective. It is an analysis of Searle's social views from 
the point of view of their relevance to social epistemology. 
The outcome of my analysis is that language is decisive for the collective 
knowledge acquisition and production. I agree with Searle for the exposure of 
language as a central constitutive component of social forms of knowledge that 
plays a significant role in the development of social epistemology. 
Section one: The proposal for philosophy of society branch 
John Searle proposes a new branch in philosophy to cover what is not covered 
by other branches. For there is a multiple layer question that we need to answer, 
Searle points out at the start in answering this complicated question first: we have 
to avoid postulating different ontological realms, a mental and physical, or 
worse yet, a mental, a physical, and a social. We are just talking about one reali-
ty, and we have to explain how the human reality fits into that one reality. We 
have to avoid postulating different ontological realms, we are talking about one 
reality. Once that is out of our way, we have to explain how the human reality fits 
into that one reality (Searle 2010: ix-x.). 
Searle attempts to explain the fundamental nature and mode of human social 
institutional reality, as he puts it in the explanatory title 'Making the Social World 
– The structure of human civilization' (Searle 2010) in which he examines the 
mode of existence of nation states, money, corporations, ski, clubs, summer vaca-
tions, cocktail parties, football games, etc. Searle also examines language in the 
creation of social reality, and the maintenance of the latter. He builds his argu-
ment as a continuum on the line of his earlier book (Searle 1995) 'The Social 
Construction of Social Reality' (Searle 1995). In describing his intention in rela-
tion to language, he writes: I will try to overcome the curse of all social (and po-
litical) theorizing from Aristotle through Durkheim, Weber, and Simmel to Ha-
bermas, Bourdieu, and Foucault. All of the philosophers of politics and society 
that I know of take language for granted. They all assume that we are language-
speaking animals and then they are off and running with an account of society, 
social facts, ideal types, political obligation, the social contract, communicative 
action, validity claims, discursive formations, the habitus, bio-power, and all the 
rest of it (Searle 2010:63). 
The new philosophy branch Searle proposes and justifies is to carry out this 
task, he calls it philosophy of society. The task of this branch is to answer the 
question that I had earlier stated, the interests of the new branch is in social on-
tology and collective intentionality. And the reason for the new branch is that the 
other branches have not answered the big question, instead they tended to either 
answer issues in philosophy of science or to present a continued debate in politi-
cal philosophy that is sometimes called political and social philosophy, in which 
they focus on deductive nomological explanations and the theory of justice. 
Searle suggestion is that there is a line of research that is more fundamental than 
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all others mentioned above, namely, the study of the nature of human society it-
self, hence is this new branch to do just that. 
The new branch is to answer some big questions, for instance, 'What is the 
mode of existence of social entities such as governments, families, cocktail par-
ties, summer vacations, trade unions, baseball games, and passports?’ This will 
generally deepen and help our understanding of social phenomena. On Searle’s 
view that this new branch of philosophy is historically situated, that is it is the 
right time to ask these questions, it could not have been taken up a hundred or 
fifty years ago. To explain this, he argues that, from the seventeenth to the twen-
tieth century most of philosophers in the Western tradition were preoccupied 
with epistemic questions, and even their questions about language and society 
were construed as largely epistemic, such as: How do we know what other people 
mean when they talk? How do we know that the statements we make about social 
reality are really true? How do we verify them? These are interesting questions, 
but in this investigation, they will be ignored. Searle tells us that writings in the 
present era have largely overcome our three hundred years of obsession with 
epistemology and scepticism. The fact in intellectual history is that great philoso-
phers of the past century such as Frege, Russell, Quine, Carnap, Strawson, Austin 
and Wittgenstein, all had little or nothing to say about social ontology, but they 
did develop techniques of analysis and approaches to language that we can use to 
establish the social ontology. Standing on their shoulders, Searle argues, we can 
attempt to look at the train they did not see, and see why this is a subject of phi-
losophy and not social sciences, as it turns out that our society has a logical (con-
ceptual, propositional) structure that admits of and requires logical analysis 
(Searle 2010: 5–6). 
Section two: Searle’s ontological project 
John Searle argued that concerning knowledge there is an initial form of para-
dox, which is : How is it possible that we can have factual objective knowledge 
of reality that is created by subjective knowledge? 
This is one way to highlight the puzzling character of social ontology, namely, 
to point out the apparent paradox in our understanding of social reality. For ex-
ample, Donald Trump is the president of the United States, this piece of paper is 
a 100 dollar bill, and so on, these are social facts and are objective facts, we 
make statements about these social facts which are completely objective, yet the 
facts corresponding to them are all created by human individual’s subjective atti-
tudes (Ibid.). Searle points out that this is part of a much larger set of questions, 
which formulates the big question in contemporary philosophy: How can we give 
an account of ourselves, with our peculiar human traits as mindful, rational, 
speech act performing, free-will having, social, political human beings, in a 
world that we know independently consists of mindless, meaningless, physical 
particles? How can we account for our social and mental existence in a realm of 
brute physical facts? How can we reconcile a certain conception of the world as 
described by physics, chemistry, and the other basic sciences with what we 
know, or think we know, about ourselves as human beings? Also, how is it pos-
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sible in a universe consisting entirely of physical particles in fields of force that 
there can be such things as consciousness, intentionality, free will, language, so-
ciety, ethics, aesthetics and political obligations? 
In asking 'What is society?' Searle proposes that there are two conditions of 
adequacy in any accounts and he states them as the purpose of his book/ argu-
ment. He writes: First, we must not allow ourselves to postulate two worlds or 
three worlds or anything of the sort. Our task is to give an account of how we live 
in exactly one world, and how all of the different phenomena, from quarks and 
gravitational attraction to cocktail parties and governments, are part of that one 
world. Our rejection of dualism, trialism and other ontological extravagances is 
not to be taken as an endorsement of "monism", for the use of the term "monism" 
already accepts the metaphysical ontologizing that we are out to reject and re-
place (Ibid.: 3–4). 
The first condition which is to not postulate many realities, this will give us 
one world that we live in, but different phenomena from quarks and gravitational 
attraction to cocktail parties and governments are part of that one world. If that is 
so, then our task is to give an account of that one world and how we live in it. 
Further, rejection of dualism, trialism and what he calls ‘other ontological ex-
travagances’ is different from endorsement of monism, for monism already ac-
cepts the metaphysical ontologizing that Searle rejects. 
His second condition is that the account must respect the basic facts of the 
structure of the universe, the basic facts given by physics, chemistry, evolution-
nary biology and the other natural sciences. Searle argues that we need to show 
how all the parts of reality are dependent on, and in various ways derive from, 
the basic facts. Searle gives examples of these facts in natural sciences; he notes 
that the two most fundamental sets of basic facts are the atomic theory of matter 
and the evolutionary theory of biology. Our mental life depends on the basic 
facts. Searle’s view is that, both conscious and unconscious mental phenomena 
are caused by neurobiological processes in the brain and are realized in the brain, 
and the neuronal processes themselves are manifestations of and dependent on 
even more fundamental processes at molecular, atomic, and subatomic levels. 
Our capacity for consciousness and other mental phenomena is the result of long 
periods of biological evolution. Collective mental phenomena, that we get in or-
ganized societies, are themselves dependent on and derived from the mental phe-
nomena of individuals. This same dependence continues higher as we see the so-
cial institutions such as governments and corporations as dependent on and de-
rived from the mental phenomena and behaviour of individual human beings. 
This is the basic requirement of our investigations; the account we give must be 
consistent with the basic facts and show how the non-basic facts are dependent 
and derived from the basic facts (Ibid.: 1–3). 
Another theme that I would like to highlight regarding Searle's direction is 
that he proposes a new branch of philosophy to accommodate philosophical in-
quiries about what society is: The entire enterprise is in part based on, and in 
part an attempt to justify, the assumption that we need a new branch of philoso-
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phy that might be called "The Philosophy of Society" (…) I am proposing that 
"The Philosophy of Society" ought to be regarded as a legitimate branch of phi-
losophy along with such displines as the philosophy of mind and the philosophy 
of language. I believe this is already happening, as is evidenced by the recent 
interest in questions of "social ontology" and "collective intentionality". One 
might object that there already is a recognized branch of philosophy called "so-
cial philosophy", on which there are numerous university courses. But social phi-
losophy courses, as they have traditionally been conceived, tended to be either 
the philosophy of social sciences or a continuation of political philosophy, some-
times called "political and social philosophy.". Thus, in such a course one is like-
ly to study either such topics as C.G Hemple on deductive nomological explana-
tions or John Rawls on the theory of justice. I am suggesting that there is a line 
of research that is more fundamental than either the philosophy of social science 
or social and political philosophy, namely, the study of the nature of human soci-
ety itself (Ibid.: 5). 
Section three: Searle’s view of society 
Sealer’s view on society can be captured on his views regarding the diffe-
rences between human and animal society. Searle’s view is that what makes hu-
man social reality different than animal reality is that humans have the capacity 
to impose functions on objects and people where the objects and the people can-
not perform the functions solely in virtue of their physical structure. The perfor-
mance of the function requires that there be a collectively recognized status that 
the person or object has, and it is only in virtue of that status that the person or 
object can perform the function in question. Examples of that can be: a piece of 
private property or the president of the USA, a twenty-dollar bill, and a professor 
in a university, are all people or objects that are able to perform certain functions 
in virtue of the fact that they have collectively recognized status that enables 
them to perform those functions in a way they could not do without the collective 
recognition of the status. 
Collective intentionality is the key for the system of status functions at work, 
in Searle’s view. For the status functions to work, he says, there must be collec-
tive acceptance or recognition of the object or person as having that status. This 
acceptance or recognition is different from approval; recognition does not imply 
approval. Acceptance is from enthusiastic endorsement to grudging acknow-
ledgement that one is simply helpless to do anything about, or reject, the institu-
tions in which one finds oneself. (…) what I believe is the fundamental building 
block of all human social ontology and human society in general: human beings, 
along with a lot of other social animals, have the capacity for collective inten-
tionality (Ibid.: 43). 
The points are these: status functions can only work to the extent that they are 
collectively recognized. For instance, hatred, apathy, despair is consistent with 
the recognition of that which one hates, is apathetic toward, and despairs of 
changing; the status function depends on collective intentionality. There is a re-
markable fact about human beings and some animals that they do have capacity 
 Samal H. R. Manee 95 
to cooperate, collectively; they can cooperate not only in the actions they per-
form, but they can even have shared attitudes, shared desires and shared beliefs, 
Searle argues; to what extent that capacity exists in other species is not clear, but 
it is clear that it exists in human species. 
So far there are status functions that exist in virtue of collective intentionality, 
further, the status functions carry ‘deontic powers’. Deontic powers carry rights, 
duties, obligations, requirements, permissions, authorizations, entitlements, and 
so on. Searle differentiates between kinds of deontic powers: 
1. The positive deontic power, when I have rights. 
2. The negative deontic power, when I have obligations. 
3. The conditional deontic power, my power, for example, to vote Democratic 
Party if I register as a democrat. I have a power to vote but only conditionally on 
registration. 
The disjunctive deontic power would be my power, for example, to register 
either as a democrat or as a republican, but not both. 
Apart from brutal facts, there are institutional facts. Brutal facts, Searle points 
out, exist independently of any human institution and example is 'the Sun is 93 
million miles from the Earth'. Institutional facts are objective facts, but they are 
only facts by human agreement or acceptance, they are facts that require human 
institutions in order to exist at all. An example is,1 Trump is president of the US. 
The definition of human institution given by Searle is that an institution is a sys-
tem of constitutive rules, and such a system automatically creates the possibility 
of constitutive rules, and the fact that Trump is president, or the fact that I am a 
licensed driver, or the fact that a chess match was won by a certain person and 
lost by a certain other person, are all institutional facts because they exist within 
a system of constitutive rules (Ibid.: 11). 
In his 1975 Searle introduces a claim (he himself calls it a strong claim) that 
the status functions are created by declarations; all institutional facts, and there-
fore all status functions, are created by speech acts of a type that Searle baptized 
as 'declaration'. 
He explains what he meant by a speech act of declaration type: some speech 
acts function by purporting to represent how things are in the world: 'the cat is on 
the mat', 'snow is white', 'Socrates is mortal'. These are statements that purport to 
represent how thing are in the world, and they can be assessed as true or false, 
depending on the extent to which they do successfully represent how things are 
in the world. Let’s think of these speech acts as if they have word to world direc-
tion of fit, Searle says, as hovering over the world and pointing down at it, as 
having fitting or failing to fit the world (literally, you can say they are true or 
false, true if correct fit exists, false if it does not). 
There are lots of speech acts that are not in the business to tell us how things 
are in the world, they are trying to change the world to match the content of the 
speech act. For example, I order someone to leave the room (this is aiming at 
                                                         
1 Searle uses Obama in his examples, for accuracy I have changed the name to Trump as he 
is now the president of United State of America. 
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causing obedience and to get your behaviour to match the content of the speech 
act). I promise to come and visit someone on Wednesday (this is aiming at cau-
sing fulfilment and creating a reason for me to come and see you on Wednesday). 
I don't report by them how a thing is in the world, but I am trying to change the 
world by producing a speech act. These cases have the world to word direction to 
fit; the point is to get the world to change to match the content of the speech act. 
There are other speech acts but we don't need to go them for this investiga-
tion. There is another class of speech act that combines both the world to word 
and the word to world in a single speech act; these are the cases where we change 
reality to match the propositional content of the speech act and thus achieve 
world to word direction of fit. Searle says, the amazing part is that we succeed in 
doing so because we represent the reality as being so changed. Searle named 
these 'declarations'. He stated that J Austin (Austin 1962) created the term 'illocu-
tions' and there are five types of illocutionary speech acts: 
1) Assertives (used to tell how things are; statements or assertions); 
2) Directives (used to tell people to do things; orders and commands); 
3) Commissives (used to commit ourselves to doing things; promises and 
vows); 
4) Expressives (used to express our feelings and attitudes; apologies, thanks). 
5) Declarations (used to make something the case by declaring it to be the 
case; declaring war and adjourning a meeting). Austin also called some cases of 
declarations 'performative utterance'; they are cases that you make something the 
case by explicitly saying that is the case. For instance, you make it a case by say-
ing 'I apologize' or 'I promise', 'I order', etc (Searle 1995: 12). 
All of institutional reality, and therefore, all of human civilization is created 
by speech acts that have the same logical form as declarations. Declarations are 
not just something that we have to linguistically treat or describe, refer to, or talk 
about, or think about an object in a way that creates a reality by representing that 
reality as created. 
In the work 'The Construction of Social Reality' Searle points out that all insti-
tutional reality is created and maintained in its existence by sets of linguistic re-
presentations that have the same logical form as declarations. We do not always 
need actual words of existing languages, but we do need some sorts of symbolic 
representation for the institutional facts to exist. To explain how constitutive 
rules fit in; the acceptances of the constitutive rule, which is part of the constitu-
tion itself, is sufficient to commit the participants in the institution to accepting 
that anybody who satisfies such and such condition is the president-elect. There 
is an interesting class of exceptions, for Searle, he points out linguistic phenome-
na themselves; we create semantics to create reality that goes beyond semantics, 
and we use semantics to create powers that go beyond semantic powers. But the 
linguistic facts, the fact that such and such an utterance counts as a statement or a 
promise, are not facts where the semantics goes beyond the semantics. On the 
contrary, semantics is sufficient to account for the existence of the statement or 
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the promise. The semantic content of the speech act by itself; is sufficient to 
make statements, promises, requests (Ibid.: Ch. 4–5). 
Searle sees language as both biological and social (Ibid.: 65), and the sociality 
of language as unique. Language is not just one social institution among others in 
the society he explains; everybody from Aristotle has accepted that language is 
constitutive of social reality, but the problem is in the explanations given on how 
language is constitutive. Searle’s view is that all institutional reality is created by 
declarations and is maintained in its continued existence by representations, 
thought as speech acts that function like declarations, but language itself is not 
created by declaration. 
Why there is this asymmetry between language and other social institutions? 
What is the difference between linguistic and non-linguistic or extra linguistic 
institutional facts? Searle states that the non-linguistic institutional facts require 
linguistic representation in order to exist. But these corresponding sentences in 
language do not require further linguistic representation to be a sentence. The 
performative creation of linguistic institutional facts is quite different from the 
performative creation of non-linguistic institutional facts. These two differences 
have to do with the nature of meaning and the role of meaning in the two cases. 
In the creation of non-linguistic institutional facts, we use meaning, the semantic 
powers of language, to create a set of deontic powers that go beyond the semantic 
powers (Ibid.: 100). 
Semantic powers are simply the powers to represent in one illocutionary mode 
or another, and these include the power to create speech acts through performa-
tive utterances. However, in the case of non-linguistic institutional facts, when 
we use language, we create more than position or special condition to generate 
non-linguistic institutional facts (Ibid.). 
Elsewhere Searle writes on why there are differences between 'Making the 
Social World' and 'The Construction of the Social Reality' books2. The diffe-
rences are explained in the following way: This article extends and develops a 
theory I began in my book, The construction of social reality. Its aim is to explore 
social ontology in a way that will make it clear that social ontology is both crea-
ted by human actions and attitudes but at the same time has an epistemically ob-
jective existence and is part of the natural world. The fundamental concepts ne-
cessary to explain its creation and continued existence are: the distinction be-
tween observer-relative and observer-independent phenomena, the distinction 
between the epistemic and the ontological sense of the objective-subjective dis-
tinction, the notions of collective intentionality, the assignment of function, and 
constitutive rules. The upshot of the discussion is that the basic notion in institu-
tional ontology is that of a status function. Status functions are the glue that 
holds society together because they create deontic powers, powers that work by 
creating desire-independent reasons for action. Thus, social ontology locks into 
human rationality (Searle 2006: 12). 
                                                         
2 Making the Social World and The Construction of the Social Reality are both are books 
written by John Searle. The first one published in 1995 and the second published in 2010. 
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Searle distinguished between ‘observer independent’ phenomena, which are 
those features of reality that exists independently of (us) observers; such as elec-
tron, mass, force of gravity, the solar system, etc. And the ‘observer relative’ 
facts, which are like $100 paper note, US Government, or ‘Trump is the president 
of United States’, etc. The latter are facts that depend on (us) observers for their 
existence, that is to say, if no human existed they wouldn’t have existed too, they 
wouldn’t have been created. Here the attitude of humans is involved, and the 
necessary condition for money, of its being money is that people have to intend it 
to be a money. Searle further argues that the ‘attitude’ itself which human have 
for the money to be a money are not ‘observer relative’ but are observer inde-
pendent. Whilst, the gravitational relationship between Earth and Moon, elec-
trons, the solar system would have been there/existed regardless of human exist-
ence and regardless whether we do know them. Therefore, social science is about 
observer relative facts, and natural science is about observer independent facts. 
So, the social institutional facts are epistemically objective even though human 
attitudes are part of their mode of existence. For instance; pieces of paper which 
are $100 are epistemically objective fact, the attitude is observer independent, the 
money/fact exists only relative to the attitudes of participants engaged in activi-
ties selling and buying, etc. He states that it is possible to have epistemically ob-
jective knowledge about money for instance, but the kinds of facts about which 
we have epistemically objective knowledge are themselves all to a degree onto-
logically subjective. 
Searle emphasises that language is essential for all of that, the essentially con-
stitutive role of language is not just to categorize and give us power, is not just to 
enable us to reach rational agreement, it has fundamental functions; for language 
is presupposition of the existence of social institutions, the social institutions are 
not a presupposition of language because they cannot exist without language, 
while language can exist without these institutions, for instance, marriage institu-
tion, governments, etc. We need the distinction between observer relative and 
observer independent facts. We also need a distinction between epistemic objec-
tivity and subjectivity on the one hand and ontological objectivity and subjectivi-
ty on the other hand. Most of the phenomena that we are discussing, such phe-
nomena as money, governments, and football games, are observer relative. But 
at the same time, they contain components of observer independent but ontologi-
cally subjective human attitudes. Though the constitution of society thus contains 
ontologically subjective elements as absolutely essential to its existence, all the 
same the ontological subjectivity of the domain does not prevent us from getting 
an epistemically objective account of the domain. In a word, epistemic objectivity 
does not require ontological objectivity. If it did, the social sciences would be 
impossible (Ibid.: 55). 
Further, Searle points out that although human society is complex, it has a 
logical structure, for human attitudes are constitutive of the social reality (like 
political parties, social events and economic transactions) and those attitudes 
have propositional contents with logical relations. The underlying logical struc-
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ture consists of the imposition by collective intentionality of status functions. If 
we are to describe the basic structure of social-institutional reality, we need: 
(i) Collective intentionality; when Searle at some point introduces his concept 
of ‘collective intentionality’, he says that collective intentionality is the psycho-
logical presupposition of all social reality. He defines social fact as any fact in-
volving collective intentionality of two or more humans. 
(ii)The assignment of function; humans have the capacity to assign functions 
to objects, the objects do not have the function intrinsically but only in virtue of 
the collective assignment. Functions are observer relative; an object has a func-
tion only relative to attitudes of humans. 
So far: the collective intentionality and assignment of function can be com-
bined. 
(iii) Constitutive rules and procedures; Constitutive rules are different from 
regulative rules. 
Further, Searle describes the logical form of the assignment of status function: 
“when it becomes regular, and thus a matter of a rule, as that of the constative 
rule of the form, X counts as Y, or more commonly, X counts as Y in context C.” 
Status functions are the vehicles of power in society. Searle argues: we accept 
them and when we do, we accept series of obligations, responsibilities, duties, 
authorizations, permissions, and rights, entitlements and so on. All of these are 
referred to as deontic powers, in Searle’s argument, deontic powers are both ne-
gative and positive and what we have in the society is a set of deontic power rela-
tions. 
Some of Searle views discussed above are revised views from his earlier book 
on social reality3 in which he builds the structure of his next book ‘Making the 
Social World: the Structure of Human Civilization’. Searle’s claims are strong 
claims and like any other strong philosophical claim generate strong reactions. 
His project is to give a theory of social ontology, where this contains many com-
ponents that can clash and can sometimes be interpreted wrongly. Both books 
generated a good deal of interest and some criticisms. Here, it is not my intention 
to make a detailed survey of them, nor on his fundamentalist aspect charges 
brought on by his critics, for it will be an impossible task to perform in these few 
pages. However, I would like to point out that criticisms directed to Searle’s view 
can be viewed mainly from two directions: a large set of criticisms comes from 
some trends in the anti-realist camp; the other direction of criticism is targeting 
specific aspects of Searle’s social ontology, for example Ruben (Ruben1997:443) 
argued against the distinction Searle makes between constitutive rules and regu-
lative rules. Ruben sees the distinction to be merely linguistic one. 
Concerning the anti-realist criticisms on Searle social ontology, I would add 
that for anyone who endorses realism Searle’s social ontology should not present 
much problem, while for the anti-realists Searle’s ontology is a different project 
altogether. 
                                                         
3 John Searle, The Construction of Social Reality (Penguin, 1995). 
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Others for example, make a direct criticism on Searle’s social reality view that 
comes from outside of philosophy. In the social and political field, Steven Lucke 
has argued that Searle’s thesis has both misunderstanding and inadequacies in its 
formulation, he added that Searle has not paid attention to unintended conse-
quences of the social reality thesis. Lucke’s view about Searle’s project can be 
captured in this: Searle’s project is to distinguish social from biological and 
physical reality, but that, it is argued, offers a restrictive account of what social 
scientists study, which extends well beyond linguistically-constituted institutions 
to include the ‘brute realities’ of social life and, most significantly, the interac-
tions between the ‘institutional’ and the ‘brute’, for example between ‘institu-
tional’ and ‘brute’ power. Searle’s critique of Durkheim’s social ontology is, in 
part, endorsed but also criticized for focusing on the latter’s methodological 
pronouncements rather than on the ontology implicit in his substantive work 
(Lukes 2006: 5). 
Conclusion 
Social ontology is about studies of nature, character, basic features, structures, 
elements-constituting social life. To this end, Searle’s account is one that stands 
out as ground breaking basis to explore what society is, for it is about under-
standing and defining what is there as social existence. 
Regarding criticisms on Searle’s ontology, in general Steve Lucke and John 
Searle hold different views. Based on different views there can be different social 
ontology accounts, for instance: one can be based on anti-realism view, while 
Searle social ontology is one of realist account, in which there are observer inde-
pendent phenomena, features of reality exist independent of us; like electron, 
mass, gravity, solar system. There are observer relative facts like dollars, go-
vernment, these are dependent on us to exist and by our collective intentionality 
they have powers. 
Searle project is one good argument that put us back into one world, one ex-
planation of how we create and maintain the society that we live in. Searle rejects 
postulating different ontological worlds. He urges that we should explain instead 
how human social institution reality fits into one reality. cashes out how the insti-
tutions are created and maintained, he examines the nation state with all its 
modes; money, corporations, parties, clubs, and so on, within all other different 
phenomena such as the force of gravitation. All of which are part of one world 
that we live in. For Searle, language is both biological and social, but language is 
constative of social reality, because language itself is not created by declaration. 
The non-linguistic social facts need institutional facts, need linguistic representa-
tion, while language itself does not require that. 
On Searle's account, all institutional facts are linguistically created and main-
tained. I too think that language should play a central role in any social ontology, 
and furthermore in social epistemology, as well as in understanding society. But 
when we bring in language and make it the central focus and fundamental for 
explaining how society created and function- runs, then it is inevitable for this to 
bring with it the diverse views in theories of meaning and how they do contribute 
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diversely in that creation and maintenance. Other questions and clarifications still 
need answering among them concerning what is known as 'problems of group 
belief justification’, for it is not clear how that fits into Searle’s project, and how 
the individual belief becomes community belief in first place with in the society. 
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